Introduction
We are immensely grateful for the very insightful and highly stimulating comments which we received by all commentators. It would be unrealistic even to try to address every point raised and so, naturally, we had to make a selection of topics to address. Our selection is based on what the commentators themselves flagged as important, but also on what seemed to be the most interesting issues. Interesting, in this case, seems to mean something like: having the potential for conflict. So, instead of stressing all the points of agreement that we have with what the commentators wrote, we focused on those issues where there was some divergence of opinion if not outright disagreement and where general debate could gain from addressing these divergences or disagreements in public.
Some important topics have been raised by several commentators. Where this is so, we have tried to discuss such a shared topic at length in our reply to only one commentator. Common topics are these. (i) The role of a notion of rationality and optimality, which was raised by Bohnemeyer, Jäkel and Liu and, to some extent, Stevens, is addressed in our reply to Bohnemeyer. (ii) Both Benz and Bohnemeyer touch upon the question of whether and if so how explanations in terms of Gricean maxims would relate to our probabilistic pragmatic approach. We focus on the role of maxims more explicitly in our response to Bohnemeyer. (iii) Benz and Stevens both spell out alternative models to explain for the data from reference games. We give general reasons why we prefer our probabilistic approach over such alternatives in our response to Stevens. (iv) Both Jäkel and Liu as well as Zeldes discuss how different sources of prior information could be brought to bear on probabilistic pragmatic models. We focus on this in our reply to Zeldes.
(v) Bohnemeyer as well as Jäkel and Liu are both concerned with higher-order pragmatic reasoning. Since this is the main part of Jäkel and Liu's commentary, we address this topic in our response to them.
Responses to commentators

Anton Benz
Anton Benz raises a number of important concerns about the apparent absence of categorical predictions in probabilistic pragmatic models. While the probabilistic approach that we sketched is able to deal with what Benz nicely terms "soft implicatures," these should, according to Benz, be kept distinct from what Benz calls "'old style' categorical predictions which are typical for Gricean intention based pragmatics" (p. 46). Benz continues to show how our probabilistic production rule for reference games can be transformed into a constraintbased computational model, reminiscent of optimality theory (e.g., Blutner 1998 Blutner , 2000 Blutner and Zeevat 2004) . This reformulation allows for a fit to quantitative data by allowing constraints to be weighted and weights to be fitted to the data. But it is also easily translated into an algorithm, in terms of constraint satisfaction, that gives categorical predictions for a speaker's choice of referential expressions. Benz' commentary is multi-faceted and touches insightfully on many fundamental issues. Let's cherrypick some of the juiciest. To begin with, there may be at least two relevant senses of "categoricality." Benz is explicit about his preferred sense: "By categorical I mean models that predict utterances either to have certain interpretations, or not to have them, in contrast to models which assign only certain probabilities to interpretations" (p. 46). We believe that probabilistic models, as sketched here, are capable of delivering such categorical predictions, if needed, without the need to transform them into anything else. As λ → ∞, our probabilistic speaker rule will assign positive probability only to those expressions that maximize expected utility. This can easily be taken as the model's categorical prediction and a special case of the range of predictions that it is capable of. Likewise, for the receiver. In other words, we can retrieve the categorical predictions of game theoretic models that are the non-probabilistic (near-)equivalents of the probabilistic rules considered here.
But there is another sense of "categoricality" that is more implicit in Benz' commentary, and that relates to the aspect of "speaker intention." It is true that the bulk of formal pragmatic models does not explicitly make reference to speaker intention. Benz' own work is one of the few laudable exceptions here (Benz 2015) . We agree that it would clearly be desirable to see more engagement with the notion of speaker intentions in probabilistic pragmatics. There are empirical obstacles to overcome: how to test what aspect of meaning is (believed to be) speaker intended? There are also technical problems: how to represent speaker intentions and their role in pragmatic reasoning. Be that as it may, acknowledging speaker intentions does not necessarily lead to "categoricality" in Benz' preferred sense. True, speakers are perhaps unlikely to carry probabilistic intentions with an utterance. But listeners may be quite uncertain as to what the speaker actually intended with an utterance. So, even if oldschool Gricean speaker intentions are explicitly represented, we would still like to model the outcome of pragmatic reasoning as a possibly uncertain belief about which of several intentions the speaker may have had with an utterance.
To sum up, we believe that non-categoricality is a good thing, especially since black-and-white predictions can be retrieved from the approach as a special case if needed. It is also the key innovation, because non-probabilistic formal models that make categorical predictions abound. Still, there may be advantages of categorical algorithmic reformulations of computational-level models, such as the constraint-based system that Benz spells out. It may turn out that, for more complex cases, algorithmic approaches that are derived from the computational-level models that we focused on here are much more manageable and resource efficient. This would be a benefit when it comes to applications, like Benz has in mind, and possibly also a route for linking computational-level models to corresponding mechanisms that are cognitively plausible and supported by relevant processing data, much like envisaged by, e.g., Zednik and Jäkel (2014) . But we also have qualms about Benz' use of maxim-inspired constraints (see reply to Bohnemeyer) and see good sense in genuinely non-categorical models, even at the algorithmic level (see reply to Stevens).
Jürgen Bohnemeyer
While our target article dealt with ad hoc reasoning about referring expressions, Quantity implicatures and (some pragmatic aspects of) indirect speech, Jürgen Bohnemeyer reminds us that there are kinds of pragmatic inferences that do not seem to be captured by any of the models sketched in the paper. Among these are, to borrow terminology from Levinson (2000) , I-implicatures, i.e., inferences to stereotype, and M-implicatures, inferences from marked expressions to marked interpretations. Bohnemeyer wonders whether probabilistic pragmatics can be extended to cover these inference types without baking further Gricean maxims into the inference engine in such a way that our goal of dispensing with the maxims would be jeopardized.
The question whether probabilistic pragmatics implements or is inspired by Gricean maxims is a conceptually important one, as Bohnemeyer's commentary makes very clear. We think that probabilistic pragmatics has little to do with maxims and that this is a good thing. We consider the Gricean maxims as very useful tools for structuring a complex set of observations about language use and interpretation. At the same time we would like to see an explanation of the data, not in terms of the maxims, but in terms of why speakers and listeners behave the way they do, given their contextual beliefs and preferences. Such ascriptions of beliefs and preferences can lead to behavior that mimics the one that is described by the maxims, but we do not ascribe these beliefs and preference to our agents because we want them to show behavior as captured by the maxims. We want them to show behavior that accords with the data. This is the same data that also inspired the maxims. There may therefore seem to be traces of the maxims in this approach, but really there are not.
Take the case of the Quantity maxim. Bohnemeyer writes that the first Maxim of Quantity (roughly: maximize relevant information content) "is effectively built into the Bayesian mechanics" (p. 64). Well, actually it is not, but we agree with Bohnemeyer that this may not have been as clear as it should be from the paper's treatment of the formal details. Consider the reference game example. What the speaker does is choose utterances that maximize his expected utility. As explained briefly in Infobox 1, expected utilities are derived from an underlying notion of utility. Utilities capture what we as modellers consider likely contextual preferences of the speaker (and the listener) over all potential outcomes of the conversational turn. Utilities are a mathematically precise way of fixing what the speaker wants to achieve in a conversation. If we assume, like we did with the reference game, that the speaker wants the listener to be able to guess the intended referent, then it follows from rational behavior based on these preferences that the speaker should prefer more informative utterances. In this sense, the first Quantity maxim follows from something more basic, namely rational choice under a certain kind of preference or goal structure.
This also makes clear in which way this approach is more general than standard Gricean pragmatics. If we ascribe different preferences to the speaker, the approach still makes predictions about what he will say. This includes preference patterns that fall outside of Gricean cooperativity, partially or completely. There is a number of contributions that have examined pragmatic language use in "non-Gricean" contexts where interlocutors may not have perfectly aligned preferences (e.g., de Jaegher and van Rooij 2011 Rooij , 2014 Franke, de Jager, and van Rooij 2012) , and our treatment of indirect speech acts is another exam-ple of that. So, in our view, the relation between maxims and rationalistic approaches to pragmatics is clear: the latter contains no trace or "reflexes of the maxims," and this shows in its ability to easily go beyond maxim-based cases, but it might mirror, or even reproduce maxim-like predictions because that may just be what is needed to explain the data. In other words, no "reflexes of the maxims" but perhaps reflexes of certain facts that the maxims are supposed to explain.
What does this mean for the prospect of explaining, say, I-implicatures or M-implicatures without appealing to maxims? -Bohnemeyer's skepticism is not unjustified. We do need to add certain ingredients in order to make probabilistic pragmatics capable of handling these types of inferences. But we do not think that these are amendments that are not natural or independently justifiable. All we need to add is more detail about the speaker's contextual preferences (e.g., add costs for marked expressions) and interlocutors' beliefs (e.g., beliefs about what stereotypical interpretations are). The rest should be (approximately) rational choice given these beliefs and preferences. We would then like to argue that the same kind of approach can, in principle, account for all of the relevant implicature patterns.
Admittedly, the devil is in the details. Although there are plenty of accounts of inferences to likely or stereotypical interpretations (e.g., Parikh 1991 Parikh , 2000 and M-implicatures (e.g., van Rooij 2004; Jäger 2014) in the game theoretic tradition, some probabilistic variants of game theoretic reasoning may run into technical problems when they try to add probabilistic choice functions (see Franke and Jäger 2014 , for treatments of M-implicature). There are even some empirical problems, but these too can be overcome by extending probabilistic pragmatic models in ways that are, arguably, independently motivated and intrinsically plausible (Bergen, Levy, and Goodman to appear) .
To sum up, we believe that probabilistic pragmatics, as a general approach, is completely independent of any maxims and that this is a relief and a good thing. We also believe that the approach as such is capable of explaining Iand M-implicatures: perhaps not without any further amendments or additional assumptions, but not in such a way as to violate the basic idea behind the approach.
Finally, Bohnemeyer also mentions two "minor disagreements" with our target article. These comments, although brief, are too valuable to pass over. For one, Bohnemeyer objects that Gricean speakers should actually "anticipate the inferences the hearer will most likely derive." (p. 67) This point about possibly including higher-order pragmatic reasoning is picked up extensively in our reply to Jäkel and Liu. For another, Bohnemeyer objects that our sense of "rationality" is too weak, because if only being "optimally adapted to solve a particular purpose" (p. 66) is at stake, the line between instinctive, evolved cleverness and genuine rationality disappears. Since the notion of "rationality" in our and like-minded Bayesian approaches to higher cognition is one that inspires controversy (see also comments by Jäkel and Liu), we would like to take the chance to position ourselves more clearly.
We are fine with a weak sense of rationality. For us, the role of rationality in this line of approach is a simple instrumental one. What we really want is to ascribe beliefs and preferences to agents, because we want to say that they do what they do because of these beliefs and preferences. Without some notion of (near-)optimality or (approximate) rationality, there is little grip to systematically link beliefs and preferences to action choices in a non-question-begging way. Ascription of, in particular, preferences and goals to our agents is to answer the relevant why-questions. Whether agents are actually rationally making these choices based on these mental state ascriptions in a way that reflects our probabilistic computations is a different question, namely a question about mechanisms, algorithms or processes. A notion of rationality might play a role for relevant processes as well (Griffiths, Lieder, and Goodman 2015) . Again, we would like to be instrumentalist here (e.g., Zednik and Jäkel 2014): rational explanations answer why-questions, are therefore independently useful, but they also structure the search for plausible algorithms and processes (see also the replies to Benz and Stevens).
Frank Jäkel and Mingya Liu
Jäkel and Liu raise a very interesting issue that lies at the heart of probabilistic pragmatics: how much interactive back-and-forth reasoning between speaker and listener should our models endorse. Jäkel and Liu suggest that our examples are not ideally chosen: while our linguistic examples are not truly interactive, our interactive examples are not truly linguistic. This is correct, but only for a particularly strong sense of "interactiveness." According to Jäkel and Liu, a pragmatic model would be genuinely interactive only if it took into account what could be called higher-order Theory of Mind reasoning between speaker and hearer. Our model for reference games would not be interactive in this strong sense. While the listener uses Bayes' rule to reason about the speaker's production probabilities, the latter are not necessarily the outcome of reasoning about a genuine pragmatic listener. In other words, our speaker rule, in this case, could be conceived of as a probabilistic implementation of a Grice-inspired informativity heuristic. It can be rationalized as (approximately) optimal production behavior under the belief that the listener interprets utterances liter-ally. But the model itself features a different model of listener interpretation. The speaker's and the listener's beliefs about each other are not in synch, so to speak. Higher-order reasoning about production and interpretation behavior is missing, and so our examples are not genuinely interactive in this strong sense.
There are several issues here. Firstly, we would like to stress that we are already happy with the weak sense of "interactiveness" that we have characterized in the paper. The most important conceptual distinction we wanted to make with the adjective "interactive" was one between, on the one hand, linguistic theories that describe or explain pragmatic phenomena in algebraic or structural terms, and, on the other hand, approaches that explicitly consider speakers and listeners. The former position would focus on pragmatic readings of sentences, the latter on pragmatic inferences derivable from utterances. The former seeks to assimilate pragmatic theory to syntax or formal semantics, the latter to goal-oriented decision making and social cognition.
But, of course, Jäkel and Liu are right. There is an important issue as to whether we should endorse shallow or rather deep reasoning models. Many game theoretic models that contain higher-order pragmatic reasoning of the kind envisaged by Jäkel and Liu exist (e.g., Franke 2011; Pavan 2013; Rothschild 2013; Jäger 2014) , including models that consider probabilistic choice rules at each level of iteration (e.g., Bergen, Levy, and Goodman 2012; Franke and Jäger 2014; Bergen and Goodman 2015; Goodman to appear). The probabilistic speaker and listener rules given in our paper would map onto a level-1 speaker and a level-2 listener in so-called iterated best response models (Franke and Jäger 2014) . Generally, a level-(n +1) agent responds (approximately) optimal to the (hypothetical) behavior of a level-n agent. Proofs exist for conditions under which a fixed point is reached after a finite level k. Speaker and hearer behavior in a fixed point can be, depending on the details of the reasoning sequence, compatible with common belief in rationality and a game theoretic equilibrium (of some variety or other). For certain natural conditions, already the behavior of a level-1 speaker and a level-2 listener can be in equilibrium (Benz and van Rooij 2007) .
Coming from a tradition of looking at idealized, equilibrium-oriented higher-order reasoning, we actually find it refreshing and to a certain extent a great relief that shallow pragmatic reasoning models often accurately predict quantitative empirical data. Ultimately, it is an empirical question how much iterated reasoning we should reasonably assume that language users engage in. Attempts to extract information about likely depth of pragmatic reasoning exist, at the population level (Degen, Franke, and Jäger 2013) and at the individ-ual level (Franke and Degen 2015) . But more research in this direction is necessary to address the point that Jäkel and Liu raise.
Jäkel and Liu spell out a sequence of higher-order probabilistic pragmatic reasoning that is aimed at deriving the scalar implicature in (1b) from an utterance of (1a).
(1) a. You may have some of the cookies.
b. You may have some but not all of the cookies.
Although this is actually a structurally more complex case with embedded scalar items (scalar some is embedded under scalar may), the emphasis is only on the contrast between some and all. Jäkel and Liu argue that, no matter which prior beliefs the listener may have about whether she is allowed to eat some but not all or actually all cookies, higher-order probabilistic pragmatic reasoning will allow the listener to derive the scalar implicature with certainty. If we map their approach onto the hierarchy of reasoning types entertained in iterated best response models, Jäkel and Liu look at a sequence that starts with a speaker S 0 whose production probabilities are unknown and remain free parameters throughout, followed by an interpreter R 1 whose choice of action (whether to take some but not all or all cookies) is defined as a rational response to S 0 's (parameterized) behavior. This is followed by a speaker S 2 who best responds to R 1 's interpretation behavior, and finally a listener R 3 who reasons about S 2 's production behavior. The critical step for deriving the implicature in question, spelled out in their Section 2.5, is that R 3 reasons that a rational S 2 will never say (1a) when it is actually allowed to take all of the cookies. We are not certain that this is actually correct, because Jäkel and Liu's derivation does not take ties into account, i.e., situations in which the expected utilities of more than one action choice are maximal. Critically, there are parameters for which S 2 would actually be indifferent between saying some or all when taking all cookies is allowed, namely when the R 1 would respond to a some utterance by taking all cookies, which in turn can be rational for R 1 for some parameters of priors, utilities and the unknown behavior of S 0 . But be that as it may, the point remains that Jäkel and Liu clearly show that it is possible and perhaps even desirable to consider higher-order pragmatic reasoning for certain applications. The question how much depth of reasoning we should assume is an important open issue for probabilistic pragmatic models.
Niki Pfeifer
Classical probabilities are not the only means of representing subjective uncertainty. Some experimental results indicate that standard probability measures might not be rich enough to explain human decision making under uncertainty, e.g., the well-known Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg 1961) . This much we acknowledged in our main article. But Niki Pfeifer's commentary goes a step further. It correctly points out that Bayes' rule is also not undisputed and that there is a bulk of empirical evidence that suggests that Bayes' rule is not always necessarily a good predictor of human inference behavior. The kind of empirical data that Pfeifer addresses in his commentary is data on human performance in reasoning tasks in which levels of credence must be assigned to conclusions from a set of uncertain premisses. Pfeifer reminds us that defining the conditional probability of A given B as
only works when P(B) > 0. Instead, many subjective Bayesians consider conditional probabilities as primitive, not derived, while assuming that the product rule P(A | B)P(B) = P(A ∧ B) is a constraint on a reasonable set of conditional and unconditional probabilities.
The main role of Bayes' rule in probabilistic pragmatics is to model the listener's inference about the most likely world state or meaning that may have generated an observed utterance. In effect, Pfeifer encourages us to open up to the possibility that conditional probabilities of an interpretation given an utterance need not necessarily be defined as:
If m is a so-called surprise message with P(m) = 0, i.e., if the listener believes that a particular messages would never be used by the speaker in any (positive probability) state, the listener's beliefs after observing m would be undefined. So, there is a crucial lacuna, a grey area of undefinedness in probabilistic pragmatic models when they do not explicate what a listener would believe if he is surprised by a message that he thought should never occur. Technically, this situation will not occur if the speaker production probabilities are defined by a soft-max function with finite rationality parameter λ based on finite expected utilities. In that case, every message has a positive probability of being used in every state, and the listener will therefore never be surprised by any message (e.g., Franke and Jäger 2014) . So, technically the problem is avoided by some versions of probabilistic pragmatics.
Conceptually, a problem remains. This is because getting rid of surprise messages by technical means, also rids us of the possibility of investigating ways in which listeners may form beliefs when they are surprised by a message. Indeed, some game theoretic models of pragmatic reasoning, in whose direct extension we see probabilistic pragmatics, have assigned a crucial explanatory role to listeners' belief revision strategies when confronted with a surprise message (e.g., van Rooij 2004 van Rooij , 2008 Franke 2009; Franke, de Jager, and van Rooij 2012) . One particularly interesting idea is that, when surprised by a speaker's utterance, the listener should try to revise his beliefs (about the conversational context, the speaker's goals, his production strategy, etc.) so that, in the light of his revised beliefs, the speaker's message is not only no longer unexpected, but even a rational choice. This would be an instantiation of what game theorists call forward induction reasoning: roughly, the idea that unexpected moves of a co-player should be, if possible, explained in such a way as to make them appear rational choices after all. Franke, de Jager, and van Rooij (2012) gesture at the possibility that forward induction reasoning is possibly a formal instantiation of key ideas about pragmatic interpretation, such as reasoning towards an interpretation that fullfils the listener's expectations of relevance of an utterance Wilson 1995, 2004) .
From this vantage point, Pfeifer's comment is spot-on: sticking with Bayes' rule only to model listener interpretation may unduly exclude a whole realm of potentially insightful patterns of pragmatic reasoning. This is definitely an area of future research where probabilistic pragmatics can benefit from looking at theories of belief formation in formal epistemology and subjects' actual reasoning patterns under uncertainty.
More specifically, Pfeifer suggests that there could be a fruitful mutual exchange of insights between probabilistic pragmatics and the literature on psychology of reasoning:
In fact, any reasoning task can be seen as an interactive multi-agent task on a metalevel: the experimenter can be conceived as a speaker and what he says is expressed in the premises which are presented in the instruction of the reasoning task. Likewise, the participant can be seen as the hearer who draws inferences or evaluates conclusions in the light of the speakers premises. (p. 91) Some recent work already goes in this direction (Tessler and Goodman 2014; Tessler 2015) . But, Pfeifer is right, there may be much more to explore in this area in the future.
Stevens
Jon Stevens confronts us with a battery of deep and intriguing questions about probabilistic pragmatics in relation to rivaling accounts. His main concern appears to be whether there can be a role for "winner-takes-all" models of strategic reasoning, of the kind proposed in previous game theoretic work (e.g., Benz, Jäger, and van Rooij 2006; Parikh 2001; Clark 2012 ) and how such accounts of strategic pragmatic reasoning can be combined with non-strategic elements in decision making. To illustrate these issues, Stevens spells out an alternative model that is able to predict the toy data set from our reference game example perfectly (at least the interpretation part of it).
It is tempting and not difficult to come up with alternative models for the reference game data. Stevens' alternative model is flanked by another alternative approach given by Anton Benz in his commentary and the probabilistic sequential decision model of Gatt et al. (2013) . Qing and Franke (2015) compare a number of variants of the probabilistic model introduced by Frank and Goodman (2012) , including the one that we spelled out in the target article. What's appealing and important about Stevens' model is that it contains predictions of perfectly rational pragmatic reasoning as a "winner-takes-all" component, but only as a fallback option. Concretely, the algorithm spelled out by Stevens for interpretation of a referential description proceeds as follows: (i) probabilistically select a random subset of referents, (ii) choose the most salient one from a qualitative salience order, (iii) keep that referent if the observed message is true of it, otherwise choose the "rational interpretation" given by a game theoretic equilibrium solution, (iv) with probability ε repeat the process from (i)-(iii).
For ε = .52, this model captures our small interpretation data set perfectly. This suggests that it could be that participants combine a non-strategic component of choosing the most salient option with a purely strategic pragmatic reasoning component, while the latter is only called when needed.
It is important to stress that, despite the algorithmic formulation of this model, Stevens wants us, for the sake of argument, to consider this a computational-level account, albeit with the added benefit that it may extend more easily to genuine mechanistic explanations on a processing level than our Bayesian model. According to Stevens, a further benefit of this model, or a model like it, is that it addresses the "question of whether strategic and non-strategic thinking both play independent roles in explaining pragmatic behavior" (p. 106). He continues to speculate that "to the extent that the two can be teased apart, we are likely to see that the most elegant models of the strategic side of this dichotomy are the good old-fashioned game-theoretic models" (p. 106).
We do not see any stark contrast between the good old-fashioned game theoretic models and the data-oriented probabilistic variants that were central in the target article. There is a continuum between the game theoretic and the "Bayesian" models, no opposition. Technically, Stevens' model is one way of merging information about visual salience with information about optimal pragmatic interpretation. Using Bayes' rule, as Frank and Goodman (2012) did, is another. Stevens' model strikes us as largely arbitrary, in the sense that it seems hard to conceive of it without having seen the data to be modelled and possibly even the criticized Bayesian model. But this may simply be a bias and a lack of imagination on our side. Stevens' approach treats salience and optimality as qualitative "winner-takes-all" components. The Bayesian approach merges a quantitative measure for each. This is a major difference. So, why not let the winner take it all?
We can think of several reasons. Suffice it to name one: do not discard possibly useful information! If all we care about is the maximum number in two sets, say {10,9,5} and {10,2,1}, we clearly loose information about the relative goodness of the alternatives. Barring empirical evidence to the contrary, keeping the relative information and making use of it, like the model we presented does, seems reasonable enough, while preferring to discard the information, on principled grounds, may be careless and wasteful.
Taken together, we do not see any good reason to prefer "winner-takes-all" components, because we do not see the more fuzzy but nuanced probabilistic variants of the game theoretic approaches in competition. The latter are a special case of the former (see also our reply to Anton Benz). There are countless ways of merging information about salience and information about pragmatic reasoning. What speaks for doing it like we suggested is that the approach stays entirely within the confines of probabilistic game theoretic models altogether.
Moreover, we even see advantages of the probabilistic approach even if it were "dumping a number of distinct psychological variables, notions of salience, attention, cognitive biases, etc., into a single Bayesian formula" (p. 106), if the alternative is an algorithmic account roughly along the lines of what Stevens sketches. While Stevens' way of bringing salience information to bear on the choice process seems plausible enough, it does not seem to readily extend to other domains where prior information would rather pertain to world knowledge or common expectations, such as used, for instance, in models for the interpretation of adjectives (Lassiter and Goodman 2015) or syllogistic reasoning (Tessler and Goodman 2014; Tessler 2015) . In other words, the benefit of the Bayesian approach over the algorithmic "winner-takes-all" approach is that it seems -but future research might prove us wrong in this regard -that the latter might obscur commonalities between different cases (reasoning about referential expression, reasoning about vague gradable adjectives, reasoning about the premisses in a syllogism, etc.), while a uniform Bayesian approach clearly shows a commonality in all these.
Amir Zeldes
In his commentary Probabilistic pragmatics and probabilistic experience, Amir Zeldes reminds us that the goals of probabilistic pragmatics strongly overlap with the objectives of the established research programm of "Probabilistic Syntax" (Manning 2003) , which he characterizes as modeling the quantities (2) P(form | meaning,context), and (3) P(meaning | form,context).
The main difference between probabilistic syntax and probabilistic pragmatics appears to be that the former is concerned with meanings and the latter with interpretations, but this difference might boil down to a matter of terminology. It seems that the two approaches mostly differ in emphasis. Probabilistic syntax is concerned with variables pertaining to the linguistic context and its grammatical properties, while probabilistic pragmatics focuses on the epistemic and intentional state of the interlocutors.
More specifically Zeldes presents results of a corpus study on different forms of requests partially confirming but also partially challenging our proposal. His findings indicate that the most frequent ways to express a request (in spoken British English) are blunt (using the verbs give or want) rather than indirect (using would like or wouldn't mind). In Section 6 of the target article we emphasized that indirect speech acts are rational in many situations. Polite requests are among our key examples.
To briefly recapitulate our proposal in this regard, we argued that indirect speech acts potentially have two types of effects which may be unattainable by direct speech: (1) They may serve to increase the subjective probability the listener assigns a proposition φ without committing the speaker to the truth of φ, and (2) they may communicate different information about the speaker's assumptions regarding the social relation between the interlocutors than an otherwise equivalent direct speech act. Politeness (such as preferring an indirect over a direct request) is a typical instance of the second property. A direct request indicates that the speaker sees herself in a position of authority towards the listener. In Brown and Levinson's (1987) terminology, it would challenge the listener's negative face, i.e. his autonomy. Avoiding this may be rational since a rational listener might be incited to assert his independence as a precaution for future interactions, which in turn may be dispreferred by the speaker.
We therefore predict that indirect speech acts of the second type occur in scenarios where the social relations between the interlocutors are (usually implicitly) being negotiated. Zeldes reports that direct requests are common among family members, especially by children addressing their parents, while polite requests are mostly used outside the family context. These findings confirm our theoretically derived expectations.
Zeldes furthermore points out that rationality considerations regarding directness vs. indirectness, even if basically correct, do not suffice to explain the choices of expressions speakers make. Rather, he argues, the interlocutor's previous experience is the decisive factor for explaining the choice and interpretation of utterances. Directly connected to this is his observation that polite formulations, while having a diachronic motivation as indirect speech acts, are often largely conventionalized.
We readily admit that the model sketched in the target article is idealized and simplistic in ignoring the role of learning and experience. We can conceive of two ways in which it can be amended accordingly, thus bringing it closer to the tradition of probabilistic syntax. − In Section 4 of the target article we attempt a definition of the speaker's utility for choosing a message p as a combination of p's expected communicative success and the quantity f (p), which summarily covers all aspects of the speaker's preferences not derivable from the direct communicative goals. This is to be understood as a shorthand for a full quantitative model of sentence production where the findings of probabilistic syntax would fit in naturally. − The basis for the rationality-based inference as described in the target article are dummy models of a naive speaker (arbitrarily selecting a true message of minimal complexity) and a naive listener (simply updating his belief state with the observed message's literal content). Pragmatically sophisticated interlocutors are modeled as -perhaps recursively -optimizing their expected utility on the basis of these dummy models. A fuller and more realistic version of our model could derive the production/intepretation probabilities of these dummy speakers/listeners from observations of previous similar interactions. (Similar ideas are expressed by Jäkel and Liu.) In practical terms this could be realized as training statistical models on corpus data. Under a theoretical perspective the extensive literature on learning in repeated games (see for instance Fudenberg and Levine 1998) is highly relevant here.
